An article

[yaduvendra mathur <ym@lbsnaa.ernet.in>]

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Friends:

Here is a scholarly presentation from Raman on Condoleezza Rice's views
on foreign policy issues, including her thoughts on
China and India. Boy - this girl is great!

Ram Narayanan



CONDOLEEZZA RICE (45)--A COLLATION OF HER VIEWS

B.RAMAN.

("China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large
part on
America's reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its
cooperation
with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust
military presence
in the region. It should pay closer attention to India's role in the
regional balance. There
is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to
think only of
Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is
an element in
China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a
great power yet,
but it has the potential to emerge as one……… Some things take time. U.S.

policy toward China requires nuance and balance. It is important to
promote China's internal transition through economic interaction
while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation
should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing
when our interests collide….. China resents the role of the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a
"status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of
power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor,
not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it.
Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in
the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security
problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position,
whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.
")



If Mr.George Bush Jr is elected the next President of the US in the
elections on November 7,
2000, Ms.Condoleezza Rice (popularly known as Condi) is expected to
occupy an important
position in the new Bush administration either in the National Security
Council or in the
State Department. What type of a person is she, what is her background
and what have been
her views on foreign policy issues of interest to India?

 Born in Birmingham, Alabama, Rice holds a bachelor's degree from the
University of Denver, a master's
degree from Notre Dame and a doctorate from the University of Denver's
Graduate School of
International Studies. Rice first came to Stanford in 1981 as a fellow
in the arms control and
disarmament programme. She was a tenured professor in the university's
political science department
and was a Hoover Institution national fellow from 1985 until 1986.

Mr.Coit Blacker, Deputy Director of Stanford's Institute for
International Studies, said of Rice: "She came
in 1981 to be a fellow at the arms control and disarmament programme to
augment her background in
Soviet affairs with a grounding in security issues. I think what struck
people at the time was a
combination of all the personal stuff ­ charm and very gracious
personality . . . a kind of intellectual agility
mixed with velvet-glove forcefulness. She's a steel magnolia. She has a
wonderful kind of Southern affect
in the positive sense ­ a kind of graciousness. But mixed with this is a
very steely inner core. She always
knows what she wants and is extremely disciplined, both at personal and
professional levels-"

Following her initial Hoover Institution affiliation, Rice went to
Washington, D.C. to work on nuclear
strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of a Council of
Foreign Relations fellowship. She
came back to Stanford when the fellowship ended.

Rice returned to Washington in 1989 when she was director of Soviet and
East European affairs with the
National Security Council. She also was appointed Special Assistant to
the President for national security
affairs and senior Director for Soviet affairs at the National Security
Council under President George
Bush. In those roles, she focussed on Poland and the former Soviet
Union.

In March 1991, she quit her White House job to serve as Hoover Senior
Fellow. Subsequently, she worked
at Stanford as Provost from 1993 to July, 1999, when she joined the
entourage of Mr.Bush Jr as chief
foreign policy adviser. During her stay in Stanford as Provost, she
cofounded the Center for a New
Generation, an after-school academy in East Palo Alto, California, and
became a corporate board member
for Chevron, the Hewlett Foundation and Charles Schwab and also a member
of J.P. Morgan's
international advisory council.

Rice is a Council of Foreign Relations member, a National Endowment for
the Humanities trustee, and a
fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

She has written numerous articles and several books on international
relations and foreign affairs,
including "Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in
Statecraft" (Harvard University Press,
1995).

Former President Bush reportedly introduced Rice to Mikhail Gorbachev in
December 1989
as follows: "This is Condoleezza Rice. She tells me everything I know
about the Soviet
Union."

She later said of her days in the NSC:"I had two bosses whom I adored,
both in President
Bush and Brent Scowcroft (the National Security Adviser). And the people
I worked with -
Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft, Baker - it was a magnificent team."

When asked about her future after she joined Mr.Bush Jr's entourage, she
said: "Ambiguity (about my
future) has never bothered me at all. I think that part of it is that
I'm pretty religious, and that probably
helps to make one less fearful and more optimistic about what's
possible. I rather like living with
ambiguity."

She also described herself as follows: " I am somebody who is very
data-driven and analytic. When I see a
problem, my first question is, why do we have that problem ­ it's not to
accuse others of trying to
continue the problem."

HER VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY HER IN AN ARTICLE IN THE "FOREIGN AFFAIRS"
(JANUARY-FEBRUARY,
2000) AND IN VARIOUS INTERVIEWS

WHAT SHE WROTE/SAID BEFORE MR.BUSH JR.'S NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE

 "The U.S. national interest has got to be to keep this remarkable
post-Cold War period in which markets
and free trade are bringing about more democratic governments. And in
order to do that, the United
States’ most important and fundamental responsibility is to keep the
global peace. So the national
interest is to make certain that we can keep the global peace, to make
certain that we’re committed to
free trade and to make certain that we keep always in our forward screen
the march of democratic
development.

"I think the American armed forces really have three main
responsibilities. The first is we are the only
army of consequence in the world that can deter "big war." By "big war,"
I mean war of global strategic
significance: the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Straits, the Korean
peninsula. These are wars that if you asked,
"What would be the effect of large-scale instability in the Persian
Gulf?" -- you look at 40 percent of the
world’s oil supply. If you ask, "What would be the effect on the Korean
peninsula or the Taiwan Straits?" --
you look at a complete destabilization of the East Asian region and the
economies there, and therefore
global financial instability. So when you talk about wars of global
strategic significance, you are not
talking about local conflicts.

"Secondly, the Americans have a responsibility when you have local
conflicts that could widen into larger
wars in areas of vital strategic interests.

"Kosovo would have fit that bill, yes, because we have certain
commitments to NATO countries. That’s in
NATO’s back yard. The potential for wider war there was pretty
significant, and so we had a responsibility
to deal with Kosovo. I think the other role for American armed forces is
to support the efforts of others
who may be capable of intervening when you have large-scale violence but
large-scale violence that is
localized. And there I would use the example of East Timor, where the
Australians were willing to step up
to the plate and the United States provided logistical and
infrastructure support, transportation support
to the Australians.

"American soldiers should serve under American command, or in some cases
when we have an alliance
where the lines of authority are clear, like NATO, I think there’s no
problem with American soldiers
serving there. American soldiers have served under U.N. mandate several
times in our history, but it has
generally not been under a blue-helmet command.

"The American President has to be able to intervene when he thinks it’s
in the interest of the United
States to do that. And it may be that there are some conflicts that are
so repugnant to us that we do
want to intervene. But I myself believe that we are masking something
very important when we talk
about humanitarian conflicts. Because what we're really talking about
are political conflicts that have
devastating humanitarian consequences. We’re talking about other
people’s civil wars, generally. And
yes, people are doing terrible things to each other, but there’s a
political problem underneath. And so, if
you rephrase the question and ask yourself, "Are we going to get
involved in the political conflict in order
to try to save lives?" -- that’s a somewhat different question.

"My own view is that most of the time we’re going to be better off to
support regional actors that are
closer to the conflict. I think, for instance, Governor Bush believes
that we should have supported
Nigeria in Sierra Leone.

"We didn’t change the regime in Iraq, but we certainly changed the
circumstances on the ground in Iraq.
And where military forces are best is when they can go in and change the
circumstances on the ground
and then get out. What we did in Iraq was to expel Saddam Hussein’s
weight, to stop his forward march
to Saudi Arabia -- and therefore a significant portion of the world’s
oil supply -- and we so disabled his
conventional forces that he’s not the threat to his neighbors that he
once was. Now, in retrospect, did
anyone believe he would still be there? No. But I think we did achieve a
great deal through the Gulf War.

"I don’t think it was possible in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. You
would have had to go to Baghdad.
The coalition would clearly have frayed at that point. And imagine the
United States essentially in the
position of having to occupy Baghdad. Might we have had different terms
of surrender for him is a
different question. Clearly, there were some things that were missed in
the war-termination phase, like
not permitting him to use helicopters and things like that. But no, I
don’t think, even in retrospect,
anyone should quarrel with the decision not to try and overthrow him.

"The chill that’s emerging from Russia is certainly of concern,
particularly the media chill. And there’s no
doubt the people in the media are feeling it.

"I think that the message to Putin really has to be that the modern
effective state is one that can tap the
creativity of its people. The modern effective state is one that can use
that creativity to join the
knowledge economy -- an economy, by the way, in which Russia should have
a very big role, given the
education level of its people, the skill of the population in
mathematics, and so forth. You don’t become a
modern state using 19th-century tactics.

"It’s just not in Russia’s interest to do some of these things. The
centralization of power in the Kremlin
away from the regions, for instance. ... I would be the first as a
Russian specialist to admit that some of
the things that were going on in the regions probably needed to be
halted -- the tax evasion, the resource
stripping, all of those kinds of things. But eventually Russia has to
find an effective and appropriate
federal system because the country’s too big to govern from the center.

"Putin is very popular. There’s no doubt in my mind that the Russians
felt the lack of leadership of Boris
Yeltsin’s last three or four years, and that they are glad that
someone’s home in the Kremlin. I think that
may be some of it. But I don’t think the Russian people are any
different from anyone else in wanting to
have the ability to have a free press, the ability to have a say about
who rules them. But it’s not that
much distance between what was true authoritarianism in Russia, and
today. And it doesn’t take much to
frighten people.

"In crisis, I think that he (Mr.Bush Jr) is someone who would bring a
tremendous calm to crisis
decision-making. He’s an analytical person. He’s someone who asks really
hard questions of his advisors
when they are recommending various things. I thought to myself, if
President Clinton had asked Madeline
Albright, ‘Why might you be wrong?’ when she said Milosevic would cave
in three days, we might have
fought the Kosovo war differently. So a lot of it is asking tough
questions so that you get the best
decision-making.

"American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus
the United States on the national
interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are:

     to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and
fight in defense of its interests
     if deterrence fails;
     to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free
trade and a stable
     international monetary system to all committed to these principles,
including in the western
     hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of
U.S. national interest
     to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share
American values and can thus
     share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
     to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big
powers, particularly Russia and
     China, that can and will mold the character of the international
political system; and
     to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile
powers, which is increasingly taking
     the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of
weapons of mass destruction
     (WMD).

"So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in
themselves. U.S. interests are served
by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other
multilateral organizations, as
well as through well-crafted international agreements. But the Clinton
administration has often been so
anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed
agreements that are not in America's
interest. The Kyoto treaty is a case in point: whatever the facts on
global warming, a treaty that does not
include China and exempts "developing" countries from tough standards
while penalizing American
industry cannot possibly be in America's national interest.

"Similarly, the arguments about U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty are instructive.
Since 1992, the United States has refrained unilaterally from testing
nuclear weapons. It is an example to
the rest of the world yet does not tie its own hands "in perpetuity" if
testing becomes necessary again.
But in pursuit of a "norm" against the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
the United States signed a treaty
that was not verifiable, did not deal with the threat of the development
of nuclear weapons by rogue
states, and threatened the reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
Legitimate congressional concerns about
the substance of the treaty were ignored during negotiations. When faced
with the defeat of a bad
treaty, the administration attacked the motives of its opponents --
incredibly branding long-standing
internationalists like Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and John Warner
(R-Va.) as isolationists.

"The United States has many sources of power in the pursuit of its
goals. The global economy demands
economic liberalization, greater openness and transparency, and at the
very least, access to information
technology. International economic policies that leverage the advantages
of the American economy and
expand free trade are the decisive tools in shaping international
politics. They permit us to reach out to
states as varied as South Africa and India and to engage our neighbors
in the western hemisphere in a
shared interest in economic prosperity. The growth of entrepreneurial
classes throughout the world is an
asset in the promotion of human rights and individual liberty, and it
should be understood and used as
such. Yet peace is the first and most important condition for continued
prosperity and freedom.
America's military power must be secure because the United States is the
only guarantor of global peace
and stability. The current neglect of America's armed forces threatens
its ability to maintain peace.

"Certainly, Republican presidents have not been immune to the practice
of pursuing symbolic
agreements of questionable value. According to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, some 52
conventions, agreements, and treaties still await ratification; some
even date back to 1949. But the
Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreements and
its pursuit of, at best, illusory
"norms" of international behavior have become an epidemic. That is not
leadership. Neither is it
isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the
world and should not adhere to
every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to
propose.

"Now the next President will be confronted with a prolonged job of
repair. Military readiness will have to
take center stage, particularly those aspects that affect the living
conditions of the troops -- military pay,
housing -- and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in
order to give the military the
capacity to carry out today's missions. But even in its current state,
the American military still enjoys a
commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage
over any competitor. Thus the
next President should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the
military of the 21st century rather
than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S.
technological advantages should be
leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile
and agile, and capable of firing
accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must
reallocate resources, perhaps in
some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than
incremental improvements in
its forces.

"The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed
forces. What does it mean to
deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the
American military must be able to
meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the
Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East,
the Persian Gulf, and Europe -- areas in which not only our interests
but also those of our key allies are at
stake. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence
function, and it must not be stretched
or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is
the role that the United States
played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the
power needed to deter trouble on
the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases,
the goal is to make it inconceivable
for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is
a compelling factor in their
equations.

"Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic
interests. Such was the case
with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America's most important
strategic alliance: NATO. In fact,
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of peaceful
coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians
threatened to rock the area's fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is
a patchwork of ethnic minorities.
For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and
even Ukrainians and Russians
have found a way since 1991 of preventing their differences from
exploding. Milosevic has been the
exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in
stopping him. There was, of
course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of
concerns based on the interests
of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

"What if our values are attacked in areas that are not arguably of
strategic concern? Should the United
States not try to save lives in the absence of an overriding strategic
rationale? The next American
President should be in a position to intervene when he believes, and can
make the case, that the United
States is duty-bound to do so. "Humanitarian intervention" cannot be
ruled out a priori. But a decision to
intervene in the absence of strategic concerns should be understood for
what it is. Humanitarian
problems are rarely only humanitarian problems; the taking of life or
withholding of food is almost always
a political act. If the United States is not prepared to address the
underlying political conflict and to
know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring
parties for an indefinite period.
Sometimes one party (or both) can come to see the United States as the
enemy. Because the military
cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian"
crises, the chances of misreading the
situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high.
This was essentially the problem of
"mission creep" in Somalia.

"The President must remember that the military is a special instrument.
It is lethal, and it is meant to be.
It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it
is most certainly not designed to build a
civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear political
goals, whether limited, such as
expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the
unconditional surrender of
Japan and Germany during World War II. It is one thing to have a limited
political goal and to fight
decisively for it; it is quite another to apply military force
incrementally, hoping to find a political solution
somewhere along the way. A President entering these situations must ask
whether decisive force is
possible and is likely to be effective and must know how and when to get
out. These are difficult criteria
to meet, so U.S. intervention in these "humanitarian" crises should be,
at best, exceedingly rare.

"This does not mean that the United States must ignore humanitarian and
civil conflicts around the
world. But the military cannot be involved everywhere. Often, these
tasks might be better carried out by
regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East
Timor. The U.S. might be able to
lend financial, logistical, and intelligence support. Sometimes tough,
competent diplomacy in the
beginning can prevent the need for military force later. Using the
American armed forces as the world's
"911" will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping
roles, and fuel concern among other
great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of
"limited sovereignty" worldwide in
the name of humanitarianism. This overly broad definition of America's
national interest is bound to
backfire as others arrogate the same authority to themselves. Or we will
find ourselves looking to the
United Nations to sanction the use of American military power in these
cases, implying that we will do so
even when our vital interests are involved, which would also be a
mistake.

"Small powers with everything to lose are often more stubborn than big
powers, for whom the conflict is
merely one among many problems. The lesson, too, is that if it is worth
fighting for, you had better be
prepared to win. Also, there must be a political game plan that will
permit the withdrawal of our forces --
something that is still completely absent in Kosovo.

"Although the United States is fortunate to count among its friends
several great powers, it is important
not to take them for granted -- so that there is a firm foundation when
it comes time to rely on them. The
challenges of China and North Korea require coordination and cooperation
with Japan and South Korea.
The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again
should an American President
go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul.

"For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right
balance in our policy toward
Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of
international peace, but the challenges
they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic
terms, that should be good news,
because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more
integrated into the
international economy. This will require increased openness and
transparency and the growth of private
industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the
Communist Party's monopoly on
power. Some see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the
Chinese people as the key. Others
see the inherent contradiction in loosening economic control and
maintaining the party's political
dominance. As China's economic problems multiply due to slowing growth
rates, failing banks, inert state
enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify.

"It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek
economic integration because this
will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political
liberalization. There are no
guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the
link between democracy and
economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and
economic interaction are, in
fact, good -- not only for America's economic growth but for its
political aims as well. Human rights
concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the
American President should press
the Chinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our
influence through moral
arguments and commitment is still limited in the face of Beijing's
pervasive political control. The big
trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to
American values through
educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial
class that does not owe its
livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful
effect on life in China.

"Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse
trade with China, this punishes
precisely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly,
Li Peng and the Chinese
conservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of
course, there should be tight export
controls on the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to China.
But trade in general can open up the
Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires
faith in the power of markets and
economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed
by experiences around the globe.

"Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing,
China is still a potential threat to
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no
match for that of the United States.
But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that
China is a great power with
unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South
China Sea. China resents the
role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that
China is not a "status quo" power but
one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor.
That alone makes it a strategic
competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once
called it. Add to this China's
record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of
ballistic-missile technology, and the
security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its
position, whether by stealing nuclear
secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.

"China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large
part on America's reaction to the
challenge. The United States must deepen its cooperation with Japan and
South Korea and maintain its
commitment to a robust military presence in the region. It should pay
closer attention to India's role in
the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect
India with Pakistan and to
think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states.
But India is an element in
China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a
great power yet, but it has the
potential to emerge as one.

"The United States also has a deep interest in the security of Taiwan.
It is a model of democratic and
market-oriented development, and it invests significantly in the
mainland's economy. The longstanding
U.S. commitment to a "one-China" policy that leaves to a future date the
resolution of the relationship
between Taipei and Beijing is wise. But that policy requires that
neither side challenge the status quo
and that Beijing, as the more powerful actor, renounce the use of force.
U.S. resolve anchors this policy.
The Clinton administration tilted toward Beijing, when, for instance, it
used China's formulation of the
"three no's" during the President's trip there. Taiwan has been looking
for attention and reassurance
ever since. If the United States is resolute, peace can be maintained in
the Taiwan Strait until a political
settlement on democratic terms is available.

"Some things take time. U.S. policy toward China requires nuance and
balance. It is important to promote
China's internal transition through economic interaction while
containing Chinese power and security
ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid
to confront Beijing when our
interests collide.

"Russia presents a different challenge. It still has many of the
attributes of a great power: a large
population, vast territory, and military potential. But its economic
weakness and problems of national
identity threaten to overwhelm it. Moscow is determined to assert itself
in the world and often does so in
ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests.

"The picture is complicated by Russia's own internal transition -- one
that the United States wants to see
succeed. The old Soviet system has broken down, and some of the basic
elements of democratic
development are in place. People are free to say what they think, vote
for whom they please, and (for the
most part) worship freely. But the democratic fragments are not
institutionalized -- with the exception of
the Communist Party, political parties are weak -- and the balance of
political power is so strongly in
favor of the President that he often rules simply by decree. Of course,
few pay attention to Boris Yeltsin's
decrees, and the Russian Government has been mired in inaction and
stagnation for at least three years.
Russia's economic troubles and its high-level corruption have been
widely discussed in recent months;
Russia's economy is not becoming a market but is mutating into something
else. Widespread barter,
banks that are not banks, billions of rubles stashed abroad and in
mattresses at home, and bizarre
privatization schemes that have enriched the so-called reformers give
Moscow's economy a medieval
tinge.

"The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's
embrace of Yeltsin and those who were
thought to be reformers around him has failed. Yeltsin is Russia's
President and clearly the United States
had to deal with the head of state. But support for democracy and
economic reform became support for
Yeltsin. His agenda became the American agenda. The United States
certified that reform was taking
place where it was not, continuing to disburse money from the
International Monetary Fund in the
absence of any evidence of serious change. The curious privatization
methods were hailed as economic
liberalization; the looting of the country's assets by powerful people
either went unnoticed or was
ignored. The realities in Russia simply did not accord with the
administration's script about Russian
economic reform. The United States should not be faulted for trying to
help. But, as the Russian reformer
Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States should have "told the
truth" about what was happening.

"Now we have a dual credibility problem -- with Russians and with
Americans. There are signs of life in the
Russian economy. The financial crash of August 1998 forced import
substitution, and domestic
production has increased as the resilient Russian people have taken
matters into their own hands. Rising
oil prices have helped as well. But these are short-term fixes. There is
no longer a consensus in America
or Europe on what to do next with Russia. Frustrated expectations and
"Russia fatigue" are direct
consequences of the "happy talk" in which the Clinton administration
engaged.

"Russia's economic future is now in the hands of the Russians. The
country is not without assets,
including its natural resources and an educated population. It is up to
Russia to make structural reforms,
particularly concerning the rule of law and the tax codes, so that
investors -- foreign and domestic -- will
provide the capital needed for economic growth. That opportunity will
arise once there is a new
government in Moscow after last December's Duma elections and next
June's presidential election. But
the cultural changes ultimately needed to sustain a functioning civil
society and a market-based
economy may take a generation. Western openness to Russia's people,
particularly its youth, in
exchange programs and contact with the private sector and educational
opportunities can help that
process. It is also important to engage the leadership of Russia's
diverse regions, where economic and
social policies are increasingly pursued independently of Moscow.

"In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security
agenda with Russia. First, it
must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia's
strength than by its weakness and
incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and
security of Moscow's nuclear forces
and stockpile. The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded fully and pursued
aggressively. (Because
American contractors do most of the work, the risk of the diversion of
funds is low.) Second, Washington
must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing
nuclear threat. Much has been
made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on
nuclear weapons in the face of their
declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is more than
adequate against the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, and vice versa. But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a
treaty that is almost 30 years old
and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the
development of national missile defenses in
the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are
nuclear threats from the Iraqs and
North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases
as nuclear weapons spread.

"Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It
ought to be possible to engage
the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their
possible responses, and the
relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment
of defenses. The United States
should make clear that it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new
offense-defense mix, but that it is
prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand, too, that any
possibilities for sharing
technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its
record -- problematic to date -- on
the proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to
WMD. It would be foolish in the
extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately
transfers weapons technologies
to the very states against which America is defending.

"Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great
power, and that we will always have
interests that conflict as well as coincide. The war in Chechnya,
located in the oil-rich Caucasus, is
particularly dangerous. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has used the war
to stir nationalism at home while
fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has been
uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in
asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation --
an unwelcome development in
civil-military relations. The long-term effect on Russia's political
culture should not be underestimated.
And the war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in
the Caucasus, as the Kremlin
hurls charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against
states as diverse as Saudi Arabia,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of
the small, new states around Russia
and of America's interest in their independence. If they can become
stronger, they will be less tempting
to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform
their economies and political
systems -- a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.

"As history marches toward markets and democracy, some states have been
left by the side of the road.
Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his
conventional military power has been
severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no
useful place in international
politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change
until Saddam is gone, so the
United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support
from his opposition, to remove
him.

"The regime of Kim Jong il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its
motivations, other than that they
are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international
system. Like East Germany, North
Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It
must fear its eventual demise from
the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to
gain and everything to lose from
engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus
provides the destructive way
out for Kim Jong il.

"President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful
resolution with the north
through engagement. Any U.S. policy toward the north should depend
heavily on coordination with Seoul
and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted
to bribe North Korea into
forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set aside. Still, there is a
trap inherent in this approach:
sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many
times, and the United States will
not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong Il do? The
possibility for miscalculation is very
high.

"One thing is clear: the United States must approach regimes like North
Korea resolutely and decisively.
The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use
force and then backing down,
as it often has with Iraq. These regimes are living on borrowed time, so
there need be no sense of panic
about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and
classical statement of deterrence -- if
they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt
to use them will bring
national obliteration. Second, we should accelerate efforts to defend
against these weapons. This is the
most important reason to deploy national and theater missile defenses as
soon as possible, to focus
attention on U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological
agents, and to expand intelligence
capabilities against terrorism of all kinds.

"Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to
disrupt simply the development of an
international system based on markets and democracy, but to replace it
with an alternative:
fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do not have the kind of
reach and power that the Soviet
Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative. But Iran's
tactics have posed real problems
for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize moderate Arab states such
as Saudi Arabia, though its
relations with the Saudis have improved recently. Iran has also
supported terrorism against America and
Western interests and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive
military technologies.

"Iran presents special difficulties in the Middle East, a region of core
interest to the United States and to
our key ally Israel. Iranian weaponry increasingly threatens Israel
directly. As important as Israel's
efforts to reach peace with its Arab neighbors are to the future of the
Middle East, they are not the whole
story of stability in the region. Israel has a real security problem, so
defense cooperation with the United
States -- particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense -- is
critical. That in turn will help Israel
protect itself both through agreements and through enhanced military
power.

"Still, it is important to note that there are trends in Iran that bear
watching. Mohammad Khatami's
election as President has given some hope of a new course for a country
that once hosted a great and
thriving civilization -- though there are questions about how much
authority he exercises. Moreover,
Khatami's more moderate domestic views may not translate into more
acceptable behavior abroad. All in
all, changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian
behavior.

"America is blessed with an extraordinary opportunity. It has had no
territorial ambitions for nearly a
century. Its national interest has been defined instead by a desire to
foster the spread of freedom,
prosperity, and peace. Both the will of the people and the demands of
modern economies accord with
that vision of the future. But even America's advantages offer no
guarantees of success. Foreign policy
in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist;
the leading contenders in the
party's presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it
will also proceed from the firm
ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory
international community. America
can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests without
hectoring and bluster. When it
does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world
becomes more prosperous,
democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the
past, and it should be again as we
enter the next century."

WHAT SHE SAID AT THE REPUBLICAN PARTY'S NOMINATING CONVENTION ON AUGUST
1,2000

"Mr.Bush believes that America has a special responsibility to keep the
peace -- that the fair cause of
freedom depends on our strength and purpose. He recognizes that the
magnificent men and women of
America's armed forces are not a global police force. They are not the
world's 911.

"They are the strongest shield and surest sword in the maintenance of
peace. If the time ever comes to
use military force, President George W. Bush will do so to win --
because for him, victory is not a dirty
word.

"George W. Bush will never allow America and our allies to be
blackmailed. And make no mistake;
blackmail is what the outlaw states seeking long-range ballistic
missiles have in mind. It is time to move
beyond the Cold War. It is time to have a President devoted to a new
nuclear strategy and to the
deployment of effective missile defenses at the earliest possible date.
George W. Bush knows that
America has allies and friends who share our values. As he has said, the
President should call our allies
when they are not needed, so that he can call upon them when they are
needed.

"He understands the power of trade to create jobs at home and extend
liberty abroad.

"The George W. Bush I know is a man of uncommonly good judgment. He is
focused and consistent. He
believes that we Americans are at our best when we exercise power
without fanfare or arrogance. He
speaks plainly and with a positive spirit. In the past year, I have had
a glimpse of what kind of President
he will be.

"I traveled with him to Mexico and saw the respect he has gained from
its leaders and the affection he
has won from its people. When he enters office, he will know more about
our neighbor Mexico than any
President in our history. He speaks to the Mexican people not just in
the language of diplomacy but in
their native tongue.

"I have watched him explain America's interests to the Russian Foreign
Minister, while assuring him that
a peaceful Russia has nothing to fear from America.

"He told the South African President of his hope for peace and
prosperity in Africa.

"I know that he understands the complexities of our relationship with
China. He believes that conflict
between our nations is not inevitable. Yet he recognizes the challenge
that the Chinese Government
poses to our interests and values and the irresistible demand for
liberty that can be unleashed by freer
trade with its people.

"And he has joined the bipartisan tradition of support for Israel's
quest for enduring peace with its
neighbors.

"George W. Bush will work with Congress so that America speaks with one
voice. He has demonstrated in
this campaign that he will never use foreign policy for narrow partisan
purposes.

"The United States cannot lead unless the President inspires the
American people to accept their
international responsibilities. George W. Bush will inspire us, because
he understands who we are.

"He knows that we are an innovative people who find kinship with those
in other nations who are
entrepreneurial in spirit.

"He realizes that we are a nation that has been forged not from common
blood but from common purpose
-- that the faces of America are the faces of the world. It has not been
easy for our country to make "We,
the people" mean all the people. Democracy in America is a work in
progress -- not a finished
masterpiece.

"But even with its flaws, this unique American experience provides a
shining beacon to peoples who still
suffer in places where ethnic difference is a license to kill.

"And George W. Bush understands that America is special among nations.
That throughout our history,
people everywhere have been inspired to flee tyranny and the constraints
of class to gain liberty and
pursue happiness in this great land."

WHAT SHE SAID IN INTERVIEWS AFTER THE NOMINATION

"One example to which I would point is the Middle East for which there
is bipartisan support for more
than 30 years. And I would assume that there would be little change in
foreign policy concerning the
Middle East. Much of the difference between the two would be between
allies and how much emphasis is
placed on our allies, how to push for free trade and there would be
other areas which would be more
important in Governor Bush's foreign policy than in Vice President
Gore's. I would point to Latin America
and the bilateral relationship with Mexico.

"The Governor supports the Nonproliferation Treaty but it is the CTBT
that he's opposed. And he opposed
it because it was a bad treaty in terms of verification, in terms of
allowing America to maintain the
reliability of the nuclear stockpile and in terms of stopping
proliferation among rogue states. So one can
be committed to the goal of reducing nuclear tensions and simply
disagree that the CTBT was the way to
do so. As to the ABM treaty, the Governor has made clear that we are in
a new environment -- post-Cold
War-- and that he intends to approach the Russians about fundamental
changes to the ABM treaty to
permit the building of defenses. Diplomacy is the art of the hard, and
no one suggests that it will be easy.
But it is in America's and her allies' interests to find a new way of
dealing with nuclear weapons, both
offensive and defensive.

"It is absolutely in America's interest to have a strong and stable
Russia, particularly one that is
democratic and prosperous. But if we have learned anything in the last
several years it is that a romantic
view of Russia -- rather than a realistic one -- did nothing to help the
cause of stability in Russia. Now
what do I mean? Pouring IMF funding into an unreformed and corrupt
economy in fact weakened Russia
and helped to lead to the 1998 crash. So realism with Russia is the best
way to encourage a stable and
prosperous Russia. We must support real economic reform, not pretend
economic reform and ultimately
Russia has enough resources including a highly educated population to be
able to create conditions to
attract private investment, but the hard work of creating a fair tax
code and rooting out corruption really
is up to the Russians. They understand this and I think resent the
United States for having failed to speak
up when economic reform was not taking place.

"The American President ought to have the option to use American forces
if he deems it necessary under
whatever circumstances, including to stop large-scale violence in civil
conflicts if he wishes. The problem
is that very often what we sometimes call humanitarian efforts are
really inserting ourselves into political
conflicts -- in other words -- into somebody else's civil war. And the
American armed forces are not going
to be very effective at the multiple global tasks that they have if they
are bogged down around the world
separating warring parties in civil conflicts. There are other ways to
stop large-scale violence including
support for regional powers that might be willing to take on the task.
We have a very good example of
that with Australia in East Timor, and we should have supported the
Nigerians in Sierra Leone.

"The United Nations may sometimes be effective for providing the
mandate, but I think regional powers,
like Nigeria in Sierra Leone or Australia in East Timor are going to be
more effective when you have
large-scale violence, than trying to cobble together U.N. peacekeeping
missions.

"The Governor has said that he would move the embassy to Jerusalem and
that he would begin
preparations for that after he was inaugurated. And we should remember
that this is West Jerusalem,
which is undisputed. A unilateral declaration of independence from the
Palestinians, the Governor would
oppose that vigorously.

"The containment of Iraq should be aimed ultimately at regime change
because as long as Saddam is
there no one in the region is safe -- most especially his own people.
There are three elements to this
policy: one is to try to strengthen the coalition of states that support
the sanctions regime; the second is
to give better support to opposition forces in accordance with the Iraqi
Liberation Act; the third is, that is
if Saddam gives you a reason to use force against him, then use decisive
force, not just a pinprick. And in
the long run, you should succeed in creating a Saddam-free Iraq.

"The fact is that the United States does need to move forward with
ballistic missile defense, but there is
diplomacy to be done with the Russians, the Chinese and most especially
the allies. I was struck by the
fact that Putin noted that there is a new threat out there from rogue
states, that he seemed interested in
boost-phase intercept. I heard him trying to make room to at least
discuss this matter. Now I remember
when we were trying to unify Germany, and everyone said you could never
unify Germany within NATO
without an explosion of the Soviet Union, and not only did we manage
that but we signed the documents
in Moscow.

"It's amazing what good diplomacy can achieve when you know what your
interests are and pursue them
consistently and persuasively.

"The first thing is that we need also to change the tone and rhetoric in
America's foreign policy. It was a
mistake to refer to ourselves as the indispensable nation. That caused
considerable resentment. We
have to consult and strengthen our relations with our allies, as a first
priority. An American President
should never again go to China for nine days and not go to Tokyo. And
then America has to be steady and
consistent and realistic about what it does in the world. Just again as
an example, it did not make sense
as an example, to call the people in Russia who were stealing the
country blind, reformers. So if you are
in tune with your allies, you say what you mean and mean what you say,
if you avoid foreign policy that
appears to the whole world like photo opportunities; then you'll have
plenty of credibility. " (31-10-00)

(The collator is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.
of India, and

presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.)

SOURCES

   1.The Home Page of Ms. Rice on the World Wide Web.
   2.Her article in the "Foreign Affairs" of January-February, 2000.
   3.Her interview from the Republican Convention venue to Policy.Com.
   4.Her Online Live Interview from the Republican Convention venue.




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